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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DONA R. BULLOCK,

)

P l a i n t i f f and Appellant,

j

vs.

)

HERBERT JOHN UNGRICHT, et al.,

)

Case No.
13697

Defendants and Respondents. )

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant reaffirms the statement of facts set
forth in the opening "BRIEF OF APPELLANT" heretofore filed and
disagrees with everything contained in the statement of facts
set forth in "BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS" in conflict therewith.

In

the interest of time and space, however, appellant will not
methodically refer to each inaccuracy contained in the statement
of facts in the "BRIEF OF RESPONDENT", but will identify these
inaccuracies in the argument hereinafter set forth.
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
This reply brief will be confined to a reply to the
arguments of the respondents found under "POINT III" and "POINT
IV" set forth in the "BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS" and, for clarity, said
points will be given corresponding numbers in this reply brief.
1
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY ALLOWED THE INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE PETITION IN BANKRUPTCY FILED BY THE APPELLANT.
The plaintiff answered the question pertaining to the
filing of a bankruptcy petition by her in April of 1971 before
counsel had the opportunity to object thereto (T395: 28-30) but
counsel thereupon objected thereto upon the grounds said evidence
was irrelevant, incompetent and immaterial. (T396: 9-10)

The

court overruled the objection. (T396: 11)
It is significant to observe that the bankruptcy
petition filed by the appellant was filed eight months before
the occurrence of the collision involved in this litigation.
Supposedly, counsel for respondents was seeking to show some
relevancy between the filing of said bankruptcy petition and the
pain and suffering sustained by the appellant as a result of the
automobile collision.

Appellant was asymptomatic until the

collision. (T340: 20-30 and T341: 1-6)

The testimony of the

appellant, however, was to the effect that any emotional upset
which she suffered in connection with her financial difficulties
was remedied by the filing of the bankruptcy petition. (T396: 18)
Counsel for respondents, however, in his desire to prejudice the
appellant in the eyes of the jurors, then asked the appellant if
it was not a fact that two creditors had filed actions against
her wherein they contended that the obligations incurred to them
by the appellant had been as the result of "misrepresentation."

2
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(T396: 19-24)

An objection was immediately made to this line of

questioning (although the record incorrectly indicates that the
objection was made by Mr, Eyre), pointing out that counsel was
going into a matter completely unrelated to the case at bar.
(T396: 25) At this point the trial judge called counsel to the
bench and an off~the-record discussion was held between court and
counsel. (T397: 8-9)

During this off-the-record discussion,

counsel for respondents exhibited to court and counsel the documents which have heretofore in prior briefs been referred to as
proffered exhibit 12-D.

These documents consisted of findings of

fact, conclusions of law and a judgment in two separate cases,
wherein it was found by the court that appellant was guilty of
misrepresentation to each of the plaintiffs therein for the
reason that she had improperly signed her husband1s name to the
loan application and the promissory note in each instance; and
that, accordingly, the appellant was not entitled to a discharge
from these debts in her aforesaid bankruptcy proceeding*

Counsel

for appellant pointed out that such evidence was highly inflammatory, would result in extreme prejudice to the appellant and
would cause the trial of the case to go off on a tangent which
would result in a completely erroneous verdict.

Counsel for

appellant even offered at that time to withdraw any claim for
lost earnings, since the court had indicated he felt there might
be some materiality in connection with that issue.

The trial

court then stated that he would allow counsel for respondents at
3
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that time to inquire of the appellant as to whether or not two
judgments were obtained against her by the plaintiffs in said
proffered exhibits*

Shortly thereafter court was recessed for

the day and counsel were requested to remain so that counsel for
respondents could offer the aforesaid findings of fact and judgments into evidence and have same marked as "12-0".
and T399: 1-4)

(T398: 16-27

Since counsel for appellant had not seen these

documents before, the Court allowed him to withdraw them for the
evening for the purpose of reading same, indicating that the
next day the Court would determine whether said proffered exhibit
had any probative value either on the question of the lost earnings of the appellant or on the matter of the credibility of the
appellant.

(T399: 8-15)

The next day counsel for appellant renewed the objection
to the bankruptcy evidence, requesting that it be stricken, and
also objected to the introduction of the proffered 12-D, the
highly inflammatory and prejudicial evidence which counsel for
respondents was seeking to introduce•

An extensive discussion

of these matters by counsel and the Court will be found in the
record, commencing at page 412, line 11 and extending over to
page 436, line 4#

During the course of this discussion, counsel

for appellant stated that if the bankruptcy evidence were allowed
to remain in, it would be necessary for appellant to offer
evidence explaining the bankruptcy, pointing out that there was
an explanation and pointing out that in spite of all the sales
4
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which the appellant made as a result of her sales ability, a
loss was sustained because of top-heavy overhead expenses.
(T427: 10-19; T431: 21-30 to T432: 1-6)

Counsel for appellant

stressed the necessity for going into an explanation of the
bankruptcy if it were going to be allowed to remain in evidence,
it being necessary to show why the bankruptcy was filed, why
schedule C was as it was, etc.
had

He further pointed out that he

ff

no idea of what we will get into from that point on.ff

(Underlining added)
The trial court declared that if counsel for appellant
sought to go into an explanation of the bankruptcy matter, the
court would allow 12-D into evidence.

The brief of respondents

seeks to "soft-pedal11 this shocking ruling by taking out of
context only a portion of what the trial court said in this
regard.

(Brief of respondents, page 5)

The position of the

trial court is made very clear by a reading of the complete
discussion of that subject.

(T434: 1-17)

It is clear that the

trial court definitely and positively used the proffered 12-D as
a threat and sword over the head of the appellant to keep the
appellant from offering any explanation of the bankruptcy, thus,
effectively keeping the appellant from rehabilitating herself in
the eyes of the jurors.

The court very properly did not allow

12-D into evidence but used the threatened admission of said
exhibit into evidence as a very effective method of preventing
any explanation by the appellant as to why the bankruptcy was
5
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filed.

The record makes it clear that she had a valid explana-

tion, as hereinbefore mentioned.
Furthermore, the record is clear on the fact that the
trial court considered bankruptcy a "dirty word" and that it was
detrimental to the credibility of the appellant. (T434: 24-25;
T435: 3-4)

It is also significant to note that the trial court

refused to permit appellant to withdraw any claim for loss of
earnings, even though opposing counsel was perfectly agreeable
to this withdrawal. (T432: 7-20; T433: 10-20) This was certainly
a strange position for the trial court to take.

It appears that

the trial court was trying to find a justification for leaving
the prejudicial bankruptcy evidence before the jury.

The

injection of the bankruptcy into this trial was erroneous and
highly prejudicial and was designed to prejudice the case of the
appellant.

The trial court felt that it was relevant on the

matter of the credibility of the appellant and it is obvious that
the jurors felt the same.

The facts of the accident were very

clearly related by the appellant and would require a verdict in
her favor, but the prejudice injected into this case by the bankruptcy, without any opportunity to explain why bankruptcy was
taken, caused the jurors to cool toward the appellant and to
doubt her integrity.

While this had nothing whatsoever to do

with the facts of this automobile collision, it caused the jurors
to question appellantfs credibility to the extent that the jury
never got beyond the liability question.

The question of any

6
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supposed effect of financial or emotional problems upon the
injuries sustained in the collision was never even reached by the
jury.

Counsel for respondents announced that he sought to intro-

duce the evidence because of the adverse effect it would have
upon the case of the appellant. (T426: .7-2)

He sought to attack

the credibility of appellant by evidence of a specific instance
of her conduct, contrary to Rule 22(d) of Utah Rules of Evidence*
The error of the trial court in permitting the bankruptcy
evidence to remain before the jury was highly prejudicial to
the case of the appellant and the additional gross error of the
court in refusing to permit appellant to offer any explanation
of the bankruptcy without precipitating the introduction of the
admittedly improper 12-D into evidence was highly prejudicial to
the case of the appellant*

There is no question that these errors

prevented the appellant from receiving a favorable verdict in
this case and that had these prejudicial errors not been committed, there would have been a different verdict*
IV
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
The trial court was afforded the opportunity to rectify
this gross miscarriage of justice by granting a new trial and
permitting appellant to try her case without the aforesaid
improper attack upon her credibility.
saw fit to stand firm in its position.

The trial court, however,
This was error.

The

purpose of a motion for a new trial is to rectify wrongs before

7
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it is necessary to seek the help of the Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
It is not necessary to cite further authorities than
are already cited in the previous briefs. Appellant does not
take issue with any of the rules of law contained in the brief
of respondents.

Those very rules cited by respondents make it

clear that a judgment should not be disturbed unless it is shown
that there is "error" which is "substantial11 and "prejudicial"
in the sense that it appears that there is a "reasonable likelihood" that the result would have been different in the absence
of such error.
The

This is precisely the situation we have here.

errors hereinbefore described were substantial and prejudi-

cial and there is not only a "reasonable" likelihood that the
result would have been different in the absence of such errors,
but there is no question that the result would have been different
in the absence of such errors.
The appellant seeks nothing more than a fair trial and
an opportunity to have her legal rights determined in the absence
of prejudice and inflammatory innuendoes.
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the judgment
of the trial court should be reversed and that this case should
be remanded for another trial.
Respectfully submitted,
HATCH & PLUMB
WINSTON A. LANGLOia?
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Mailed a copy of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF
APPELLANT to Attorneys for Defendant/Respondents:
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN
J. ANTHONY EYRE
520 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
this 17th day of June, 1975.
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